At its center, this lecture focuses on the crisis of culture and religion-which essentially condenses to acrisis of the state,asglobalization is bypassingthe state -byaddressing Islamic fundamentalism and by providing amore global view on the topic. Fundamentalism is not ap roduct of tradition, but amodernp henomenon -aresult as well as an active player of globalization. It disconnects religion and the concept of revelationfrom culture (as is the case in Salafism). Thus,aniconoclastic concept of culture and history has emerged (e.g.Daesh in Saudi Arabia). There are common traits between different kinds of fundamentalisms:anexplicit system of norms and asocial life, which reduceslife to living in afaith community with high distrusttowardssociety in general. Aprobleminthe contemporary globalized world is the need to make everything explicit, whichisopposed to culture. This trend reflects nothing but an ormative system that can only be implemented in an authoritarian way.What follows is the crisisofculture -the destruction of the very concept of culture -that such atype of globalization promotes.Breaking this cycle entails refraining from indulging in this kind of systematic "normatization" of everyday life and trying to reopen aspace not only between believers and nonbelievers, but between everyone. Ultimately, this calls for the need to reopen the discussion on the relationship between culture and religion in practice.
Introduction
Globalization entails acrisis of the very concept of culture.How can we build a political society if we do not share culture at alocal or global level?Apolitical societyisbuilt on something we have in common.Itsanidentity.Itcould be many things:asocialorpolitical contract, an ethnicity,alanguage,ahistory,atradition. By definition in our modern societies it is usually connected to the state.The state is,i nasense,t he representation of the society.W ec an discuss political representation inside the state,but the state in itself is arepresentation of the society. What we have now is the crisis of the state,because globalization is bypassing the state.The constructionofEurope is avery concrete case of local globalization, if I may call it that. So what we see as its revenants (fundamentalism, populism) only form part of amutation of the relationship to culture.Modern populism is not the same as old populism.Itsnot fascism.Itsnot Nazism. Of coursewecome across some common elements like xenophobia, the quest for aDuce and so on;but in terms of normsand values,modern populism is far more complexthan it seems. In my lecture Iwill start with Islamic fundamentalism and proceed to amore global outlook.
Islamic Fundamentalism:aProduct of the Crisis of Culture
Thep roblem with Islamic fundamentalism is that it is commonly perceiveda s something coming from the past, fromat raditional, medieval kind of Islam; medieval is aterm very often used to qualifythis kind of Islam. Theproblem is that there never was such an Islam in medieval times.I nas ense,a sf ar as Islam is concerned, medieval times were far more enlightened.Another issue is theology: what in Islamic theology triggered what we considertobefundamentalism today? Forinstancethere is an entire debate on the term "jihad"and the unsubstantiated idea that Islam lacks reformation in order to be adapted to modernt imes.T he question is how atheology called Salafism could be revivified. We had aconference in Beirut two months ago on religion and violence,inwhich all the professors of Islamic Sunni Theology of the University of Beirut said: "When Iwas ayoung studentnobody was speaking about Ibn Taymiyyah, nobody was speaking about the Salafi. Now we are confronted with Wahhabism, these strange guys in Saudi Arabia, the Bedus,but we used to teach falsafa, philosophy,atthe universities and Id on ot understand how we could get from this kind of culture of enlightened Islam at the facultyofTheologytothis kind of Salafi teaching.Itisnot traditional Islam at all -itsnew." My own research shows that fundamentalism in general, not just in Islam, is not aprotest of tradition against modernity and globalization. It is,onthe contrary,aproduct and an actor of globalization. Why?Because the strength of this kind of fundamentalism is that it explicitly disconnects religion and culture.Salafism is totally opposed to culture.What is its theological basis?
Salafi Iconoclasm:Erasing Culture and History
Thetheological basis that can be found in Ibn Taymiyyahand Abd al-Wahhab is that you cannot know God, so there is no possible contact. It corresponds to asort of negative theology.W eknow God only throughhis will. We cannot interpret, because if we interpret, that would mean that we can thinklike God, which is not the case.Sowehave to take the revelation as something which is not and should not be historical or connected to any culture at all. Everythingthat happened at the time of the prophet is withouti nterest and at worst heresy and paganism. Salafism puts three things on the market:firstly,norms (dos and donts), secondly, explicit norms,since there is nothing implicit there,and thirdly,the absence of a connection to aspecific society. So Salafism is atoolkit which works everywhere, in any circumstances.There is clearly an iconoclastic concept of culture and history.Ifyou look at Saudi Arabia -itsystematically destroyed what could be called Saudi culture,Saudi archeology,Saudi history,Saudi tradition. Theresult is Las Vegas plus Sharia, whichisMedinatoday.But it is less fun than Las Vegas.Inthis sense,w ith Daesh, we have the explicit dimension of iconoclasm:t hey want to destroy everythingwhich is linkedtohistory. This is very interesting because,ina sense,Daesh is the logic of Salafism carried out until the end -and with the end I mean the apocalypse.They have no faith in the future.Ajust Islamic society is not sustainable for them;itsjust the prefiguration of the coming of the Antichrist. To make the coming of the Antichrist happen, they have to get rid of everythingthat belongs to the past.T here is also an interesting dimension of negation of genealogyw hich is very strong in Daesh. Instead of speaking about ar eligious ideology,weshould see Daesh as anarrative.
The Generational Dimension
If you look at the profiles of the people who join Daesh eithert op erpetrate terrorist actions or to fightjihad, there are two figures:second generationMuslims and converts.T hey do not join just because they belongt oasecond generation of whose parents came to Europeinthe 60s and 70s or because it is normal to be aS alafist in this situation.N o, we have had second generations in radical terrorism for 22 years.T hey arrived in 1995, and since then there has been the same profile.W edonthave athird generation. After such along period of time, there should be at hird generation, purely in the interest of demographics. However, therea ppearst ob eo nly af irst generation, as econd generation, and converts,whose profile has been the same since 1997. When looking at origins,itis evidenti nG ermany,f or instance,t hat only 10 %o ft he radicalsh ave Turkish origins,although the Turks represent at least two thirds of the Muslimpopulation.
Everywhere,the Moroccans are overrepresented:the bulk of the terroristsin Belgium are Moroccans,asinHolland, as in Denmark, and to acertain extent in Germany too.T hereare ahigh number of brothers:Inevery terrorist cellsince 1997 until the Bataclan there has been at leastapair of brothers,sometimes sisters, but no fathers.20to25%of the people who have perpetrated aterrorist attack in the West had achild in the year preceding the attack. Thebest example is the San Bernardinoattack in 2015 in California. Theman is asecond generation Muslim, his wife is from Pakistan. They had alittle girl and one day,when the little girl was nine months old, they left the girl at her auntsh ouse and went to kill fourteen people and themselves. All of the people who are sent to Jihad are askedtomake children and all the girls who go to Syria are requested to be mothers.All the men die in the months following the birth of their sons.Sothere is aconnection to this very concept of generation.
In addition:before killing themselves,beitinSyria or in Europe,the terrorists very oftencall theirmother,never their father, and say:"Mother,you are abad Muslim,because you will cry once you hear that Iamdead. But on the contrary, you should be very happy.Firstly Iamgoing to paradise andsecondly Iwill bring you with me." By doing this,they turn the generational dimension around. The parents have eternall ife thankst ot heir children. There is this dimension of a shortcut in history and genealogy,which goes alongwith an apocalypticvisionand apersonal apocalyptic religious idol. Of course Daeshisthe utmost extreme,but it conforms to the idea that religious life is not sustainable.You cannot live as agood believer, because you are asinner.Therefore,you have to catch the moment when you can go directly to paradise.Referringback to Salafism:Salafism is not suicidal at all. They believe that life is given by God for you to learn how to get to paradise. Youmust followthe rules,and if you do that for your whole life,itwill work out. There are also explicit dos and donts here.T here are no grey zones -y ou are either in or out. This means that you have aproblem with socialization,since you cannot socialize with "wrong believers" -with Christians.You are only allowed to socialize withinyour own community.
TwoDigressions on the Question of "the Explicit"
Then Iworked on Christianity and Evangelicalism.Inthese cases,the focus is on honor,which is why one is to be born again and fightasecond time.Once one is born again, one cannot be associated with "wrong believers". Youcan preach to the population, but you cannot socialize with people who do not believe.Here, everything is also explicit. It means that confessions are public.Y ou cannot even confessa da uriculum which is very interestingb ecause Catholicismi s, what I would call, the management of the grey zone;s ecret, implicit and accepting of conformity.There everything stays between you and your confessor.
These are the common traits between all kindsoffundamentalisms: an explicit system of norms and asocial life reduced to the life in your faith community with big distrustt owards society in general. This creates many problems,b ecause norms are non-negotiable. Societye itherconforms to your set of norms or that society is considered to be pagan. 1) If we take the Catholic Church for example,wecan say that since Humanae vitae the church has put the issue of norms on the table.The socialgap issues like abortion and gay marriage were not linked to the church beforethe 60s.Abortion was banned in France in 1921 by parliament, without any pressuref rom the Church. Thec riminalization of homosexuality was very common in Western Europe until the 60s.Itwas not arequest from the Church, it camefrom society itself.The 60s were very important, adivorce of values and norms.Suddenly there were no shared norms between the faith communities and mainstream society. This gap has widened since then, the last issue being same sex marriage.Thereisa probleminthis case because the Church -the Catholic Church in particular -does not ask people to follow Godsnorms. TheCatholic Church has aconcept, namely naturallaw,which is precisely the grey zone,the idea that you do not need to be a believer in order to agree on certain ideas.There can be consensus without sharing faith. Faith is not compulsory.W hen the church decided to take to the streets againstgay marriage,Cardinal Barbarin was very clear:itisnot becauseweare following God, but because the institution of gay marriage is abreach in natural law,a na nthropological revolution. He was rightb yt he way;Ithink it is an anthropological revolution. In doing this,hetried to build acoalition with the grey zone -people who are not believers at all -and with Muslimsand Jews,inorder to build acoalition of people who are against gay marriage,not on religious buton anthropological grounds.T he only people who joined him were some Lacanian psychoanalysts,s oi tw as ag reatd isappointment for the Church. Since this demonstration, we have had the rise of aCatholicparty "Sens commun"for the first time in France since the toastofCardinal Lavigerie in 1891. This party goes into politics with aC atholic program in the nameo fG od. Thec onference of bishopsisnomore in charge.Sothe debate is once again on norms,explicit norms.
2) If we look at the otherside we find something interesting:what is the other side?I ti sf reedom, liberty,s exual life and so on. Here,m yf ield work was in California in 2009. California is 1968 squared, "itsm yc hoice", it was the selfinstitution of the self,"Idowhat Iwant, Icreate my life", freedom as the criteria for building as ociety -t hat all started from there.E vangelicalisms tarted from here too.After spending one year in California, Ifound that it was one of the most regulated societies that Ik now.Y ou have an extraordinary complex of regulations. Everything is regulated. Strangely,i t saplace where everything is supposed to be "my life and my choice", but then people permanentlyregulate their own life.You cannot invite achild, you can only invite your own childsfriend. But when you do,you have to fixate on everything, at whichtime he comes,atwhich time he leaves,what he will eat;you have to speakwith the other parents.Ifyou invite their kid to ab irthday party,y ou have to checkw hethert hey eat kosher, vegetarian, halal etc. Everything is regulated. So Id ecided to explorethat. It is now areal problem. Forinstance,sexual life and the implicit:Y ou have to have a ten page contract before asking somebody to date you. Everything has to be explicit. My children had classes on how to say yes and no,how to ask things -they were not even ten!They had classes asking them to be explicit about everything they do.N ever touch people.T he "explicitation"o fn ormativity,f or instance emotions in emails -they are not that much fun, they are the "explicitation"; you have to explicitly say whatyour state of mind is.Y ou cannot make ajoke without adding:"This is ajoke!" It is not just California, now it is systematic. Isentajoke to my secretaries at the institute and they were totally perplexed. They asked me "What is the status of your email?" Isaid:"Itsajoke."-"Howfun!Next time put an emoticon, so we know that itsajoke." Youcannot makejokesifyou do not explicitly point out that it is one and this trend is going veryfar in language, for example.
Globish as aLanguage without Culture
As you know we speak Globish and we will speak more and more Globish once British is out.When it is no longer in the EU,wewill have no cultural references when we speak English -a tl east we will understand each other, because the people who really speak English will not be here.Sothere will be acreolization of English, but that will also bring about the "explicitation" of English.Ifyou look at the Englishofthe European Union:that is not British English at all. Once again everything has to be understood by someonewho is not anativespeaker.Sothere are words which you will never use.Y ou will never say "siblings" -that would be too complex -you will say "brothers and sisters". It will never be more than 2500 words plus your right to use 300 technicalw ords like "benchmark"e tc. Then everything will be contractual,everydaylife will become more and morejudicial. There is an extensionofthe regulations to school administrations etc.,which are all based on the same thing:y ou have to make everything you do and think explicit. Kill the implicit, which is exactly the same as killing the culture.
Thestatusofculture in court is very interesting. Twenty years ago you could argue in court that aclient perpetrated acrime but he/she was influenced by his/ her culture.T wenty years ago,that was areceivable argument. Thejudges would accept it as an excuse,but now itsanaggravation. Thestatusoffemale excision for example:i th as changed in the last twenty years.T wentyy ears ago the anthropologists would come to court and say:"They have different customs" and the court would be lenient, but not at all now.B yt he way,t he courts now have a tendency not to define that as cultural obligation but as areligious obligation, thus turning something which is in fact cultural into areligious norm. Iwill stop here on that.
The Collision between the European and the Christian Identity
Thelast point is identity.The identity which is broughtupnow by the populists has nothingt od ow ith culture or history.I nw hat way do we oppose Islam in the European debate on it?W eo ppose Europeanv alues and EuropesC hristian identity.T he only problem is that European values are totally opposedt o Christian values.T he German, Belgian and Dutch governments have questionnaires for visa applicants and immigrantsw hich are all about whether they accept "our values" and Iw ould sayt hat the pope could not sign such aq uestionnaire.I nG ermany one of the questions is "Do you accept nudity in public space?" Youcannot imagine Cardinal Ratzinger saying "I am German, Iwill tick that box."The last thingIfound was in Belgium:The Flemish government has a questionnaire for Moroccans.Itsays:"Flemish sleep at ten p.m."and if you look at all questionnaires,you have an ideal normative life which is the life of nobody,of course,but is constructed as the national identity.For instance,inthose countries which consider gay rights to form apart of the Europeani dentity there is abig problem, becauseitmeans that Catholicism is not part of the European identity; that you have no righttobeaconservative religious man.Ifyou were,you would not be able to sign this kind of questionnaire.Sowhere are we going with that? Precisely to the delegation of real cultures whichare all based on the implicit. If you makee verything explicit, you have no culture anymore.Y ou only have a normative system which, by definition, could only be implemented in an authoritarian way.I t sw hat Ic all the crisis of culture,t he destructiono ft he very concept of culture by thiskind of globalization.How can we deal with that now? Thef irst duty is not to indulge in this kind of systematic "normatization" of everyday life.T hat is exactly what Francesco Ghia said.W ewent too far in this definition of religion as normative.T he question is how can we reopen the grey zone,not only betweenbelieversand nonbelievers,but between everybody? The fact is that we consider religions to determine the everyday life of people -w e have this idea that "a Muslim is aM uslim", that he has some kind of Koranic software in his mind and if you want to influence the possibility of aMuslim to adjust to Western society you have to go back to that Koranic software,reopen it, change the concept of "Jihad" and then put it backi n. We have an ormative concept of theology, whichm eans that in fact we do not address religiosity or spirituality in the way abeliever experiences his own religion. It has become this complex area which is not studied anymore,now in our societies we are moreand more religiously illiterate and the most vivid forms of religion are culturally illiterateb ecause they do not want to addresst he issue of culture.W eh ave to reopenthe relationship betweenculture and religion in practice,not by having a big discussion about it.
Questions and Answers
Q: Yousaid it is aprocess of globalization and Iappreciate the parallels you have drawn between Salafism and California, but what is it in the process of globalization that is drivingthis? R: Ithink globalization is,bydefinition,aprocess of "deculturation" through the loss of traditional or national cultures.Itisalso aprocessofmobility and if you want to be mobile,you must travel lightly with as little cultural luggage as possible. Therefore,you develop some sort of travelkit of how to adapt to societies.This is why Salafism and Evangelicalism workw ith peoplew ho are mobile, in as ense, even if it is not so willingly.T hose people could be going to California to find a good job or ordinary immigrants or whatever you might thinkof. So the second point is linked to individualism, this kind of normative system -you do not need to be part of af ace community,e ven though you might think you are part of one, because very often you meet your face community on the internet. Youyourself can decide,and do it yourself.Itisvery interesting to see how these people discuss norms of everyday life between themselves.The infidels wear their watch on their left hand, so should agood Muslim wear his watch on the right hand?This kind of debate is about the little things that show who you are,how you lead your life.That also means that it worksw ell for people who are not well socialized. They reconstruct theirs econd generation identity based on as et of formal norms.T he problemisthe sustainability of this process:You cannot study alanguage over ten years,you need alanguage that is immediately accessible.Globish is one of these languages,but the Pentecostalistshave glossolalia which is fantastic -you speak every language.
Youd on ot need al anguage.G odsw ord passesf rom you to someone else immediately.Y ou do not need cultural mediation. Ithink this is part of the Pentecostalists success.B efore the internet they invented aw ay of communicating immediatelywithout the need of adictionary or grammar.Normativity is aset of regulations for everydaylife which could take differentforms according to context (religious, non-religious);a nd the domesticationo fb ody language is extremely important. Thesame thing goes foraSalafi-you should not smile,you have signs which indicate immediately that you are aSalafi (no moustache) and the wording,the use of specific vocabulary. There is aSalafi Globish which is very interesting, because they speak the local language but they have ar eservoir of specific terms that they use only in Arabic, e. g. din instead of "religion", because if you said religion it could imply that Islam and Christianitya re the same thing.
Youhave some sort of acopyright on expressions;for example in Malaysia, the law is that Christiansare not allowed to use the word Allah, while in Arabic the term means God. On the secular side,there is the debate on cultural appropriation, which is very interesting.Now if you are not African-American according to some groupsyou cannot use signsbelonging to the African heritage.T here was the Dolezal case in the US -she was agirl who represented the black community in asmallcity in Montana for years and one day her brother and parents wenton television and said:"But she is not black, we are all white!Blond, blue eyes." It was ahuge scandal.She lost her job,her husband who was black divorcedher, and she was seen as atraitor by the black community in general (not the local one). Theaccusationwas that of cultural appropriation because she tried to have relatively dark skin and she combed her hair the African way."Youare not black so you have no right to use our way of living."That is very closetowhat populistsare doing. It is the samet hing;" It is our identity." Fori nstance, the normative approach of the boycott of white Gospel singers;t his is linked to the idea that a specific type of music and away of dressing is copyrighted by aspecific group.We used to say that globalization is relation, and now we have the exactopposite;the reappropriation of cultural elementsb yp eople who thinkt hat they are the legitimate owners of this or that trait of cultural behavior. Often this leads to court in the US,but more and more in Europe too.The courts have to make adecision on this.Sohere normativity is reinforced.T he courts mightberelatively liberal and reject the case,but that means that the case is always deferred to anormative system however it may work. 
